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 Beware the unexampled aphorism, however beguiling in appearance, for 
opposing parties can quote scripture to their own, divergent purposes.  An 
excellent case in point is provided by Gottlob Frege's celebrated context principle:  
We must never try to define the meaning of a word in isolation, but only as it 
is used in the context of a proposition.1  
"That sounds very nice," we should demur, "but can you supply some concrete 'fer 
instance' that makes clear what you have in mind?"  Indeed, the context principle 
has been accorded the most extraordinary gamut of readings in the standard 
literature, in a fashion that draws misty uncertainty over the interpretation of 
virtually every other central contention within Frege's corpus.  To encounter such a 
nugget of refractory murkiness is surprising, for he is not an author who otherwise 
courts obscurity. 
 Nonetheless, these obstacles are entirely Frege's fault, for the following 
reasons (for which the remainder of this essay will argue). 
 (i) As he wrote the Grundlagen, Frege had in mind a concrete family of 
practices, to be found in the "higher geometry" of his time, that he regarded as 
exemplifying the context principle as he intended it.  This methodology, which was 
practiced in the Göttingen of his student days, is not one of "contextual definition" 
in the usual sense of the term, although allied to it in spirit (which explains why 
Frege's attitude towards "definitions in context" often seems elusive.  
 (ii) He initially planned to imitate these same policies in his own treatment 
of number, in a manner that sidesteps any need to cite a brute comprehension 
principle of an axiom V type. 
 (iii) However, in the course of writing sections §§66-8, he realized that a 
subtle hitch impeded total fulfilment of his ambitions, so he swiftly reverted, 
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without adequate signal to the reader, to a workable form of comprehension 
principle that was also popular in the geometrical methodology of his time.  This 
shift allowed him to defend a logical analysis of number, but the alteration in 
underlying policy leaves the context principle unillustrated in his own endeavors.   
 (iv) Because the glitch in question seems so minor, he continues to believe 
(at least for the entire period in which he worked upon the Grundlagen) that the 
angel of the context principle continues to hover over his endeavors as a patron 
saint, even though he actually resorted to cruder expedients to get the job 
accomplished.  
 (v) Because he fails to alert his readers to the geometrical precedents in 
sufficiently vivid terms and because those activities have now faded into the 
twilight of forgotten mathematical exploit, the modern reader is left with little clue 
as to how Frege originally expected to apply the context principle to numbers.  
Worse yet, the original paradigm of application that Frege had before his eyes is so 
bizarrely unexpected that few readers unfamiliar with nineteenth century 
geometrical practice will be likely to reconstruct its framework solely on the basis 
of Frege's own words.  This loss of vital background leaves the modern student of 
the context principle wandering in the wilderness, with no geometrical compass 
home.  
I have told a tale of the Grundlagen of roughly this narrative shape before, 
but I had some critical details muddled--specifically, I did not sufficiently 
distinguish the methodological approach pioneered by the German geometer Karl 
von Staudt from that introduced by his contemporary Julius Plücker, even though I 
discussed both men in those earlier writings.  I saw my way to improvement only 
after reading an excellent essay on the context principle by Thomas Ricketts,2 
which is perhaps the best commentary written on our topic.  Ricketts, however, 
makes no linkage between his stress on the manner in which "objecthood" and 
"range of variation" fit together and the geometrical practices recounted here.  
However, once these complementary  strands of doctrine are brought into 
alignment, the Grundlagen's most mysterious passages can be supplied with 
satisfactory and concretely focused readings, able, in fact, to correct a few points 
where I regard Ricketts' unsupplemented account as strained.  Such are the benefits 
of linking slogan with robust example. 
 It turns out that the intended workings of the context principle can be best 
illustrated by examining the geometrical heritage from which Frege apparently 
extracted his methodological inclinations (and in whose terms much of his early 
mathematical work unfolded).  As I explained more fully in my "Royal Road" 
paper,3 the Grundlagen's rather odd discussion of how the object the direction of 
line L can be defined in terms of the concept --is parallel to L is actually plucked 
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from prior geometrical discussions that seek to equip every line with a 
supplementary point lying at its infinitely faraway tip.  Besides these additional 
points at infinity, geometrical practice also claims that many imaginary points sit 
upon a plane at coordinate locations such as (-3 √ -1, -1.5).  The apologetic tales 
first offered, in the early nineteenth century, on behalf of these outlandish 
intrusions often sound rather mystical.  Thus the important German geometer Jacob 
Steiner wrote:  
In this manner one arrives, as it were, at the elements, which nature herself 
employs in order to endow figures with numberless properties with the 
utmost economy and simplicity; the organism, by means of which the most 
heterogeneous phenomena in the world of space are united one with 
another4  
Indeed, if we take such comments, along with those of his distinguished 
contemporary J.V. Poncelet, seriously, we are allowing stolid, venerable Euclidean 
geometry to be invaded by ghosts.  Indeed, the great expositor Felix Klein later 
wrote: 
The older geometers, Poncelet and Steiner, were never clear on [the exact 
rationale for geometry's extension elements].   To Steiner, imaginary 
quantities were ghosts, which made their effect felt in some way from a 
higher world without our being able to gain a clear notion of their 
existence.5          
Because we are seeking a vivid context for Fregean phrases such as "recognition 
judgment," a quick sketch of how Poncelet and Steiner conceptualized the evidence 
for these novel apparitions will help set the scene (these details won’t be critical in 
the sequel).  The area of geometrical concern in which they worked investigates 
what happens to images under sequences of projection from one kind of screen to 
another.  In the diagram, light bulb A projects the cat image painted on the left face 
of sphere S onto its opposite hemisphere.  Light bulb B then transfers this doubled 
pattern as a shadow onto the 
plane P (we allow light to 
travel backwards from the 
image to the bulb, which is 
why a portion of the left 
hand cat face appears over 
the horizon to the right!).  
Despite all the stretching and 
compression that occurs, a 
good deal of abstract 
pictorial structure remains preserved within  the planar recasting.  It turns out that 
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its critical ingredients can be encapsulated in a remarkably simple way.  Let us 
draw a conveniently placed x-axis L upon the plane. Two special points (a,0) and 
(b,0) can be located on L around which the corresponding parts (labeled as x and 
x') of the cat image must cluster in a very special way: viz. the ratio of the distance 
λ from (a,0) to the right-hand cat’s chin over the distance µ of the matching left-
hand chin x' with respect to (a,0) will equal the negative of this same ratio with 
respect to (b,0).   And so on for every other alignment between the two cat 
portraits. images.  This important form of pictorial correlation (a “harmonic” 
mapping between x and its mate x' along L) is called an involution and (a,0) and 
(b,0) represent the two self-corresponding points of the map (they also represent 
the images of the tangent points that light A makes with the sphere).  In fact, the 
placements of (a,0) and (b,0) completely control all of the spatial relationships 
within our doubled image, for our “cross ratio” invariant can construct the 
placement of every pair of correspondent cat parts.  More general planar points 
(a,c) and (b,d) likewise represent the “controlling points” of more complicated 
mapping situations of this same ilk.  Thus far our account of geometrical fact 
remains entirely free of ghosts.   
 Notice that our two cat faces wind up oriented oppositely to one another on 
the plane.  However, if the initiating light bulb A is moved inside the sphere S, we 
obtain a doubled planar shadow where the two cat heads now point in the same 
direction.  Here their correlated parts match up along L in an overlapping rather 
than nested pattern; hence no 
self-corresponding points will 
be evident.   However, if, 
following Steiner, we allow 
imaginary points such as (√-1 , 
0) to sit upon L, we can again 
produce two simple “control 
centers” that completely fix all 
of the overlapping associations 
found in our new form of cat 
map.  According to Steiner, 
such imaginary points represent 
hidden "elements, which nature herself employs in order to endow figures with 
numberless properties."  "But we can't see any such points," we complain.  "Ah, by 
their involutionary weaving you shall know them," replies Steiner, “look at the tidy 
ordering that persists in our new variety of cat map.” Clearly, this is an argument in 
favor of ghosts, quite comparable to asseverations that we wouldn't be hearing 
chains dragged up the stairs if this joint weren't haunted. 
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 Without delving further into more mathematics of this ilk, it is hard to 
convey the astonishing degree of unification amongst seemingly unrelated 
behaviors that blesses traditional geometry once these bizarre gambits are 
tolerated.  Nor can I adequately survey the legions of allied extension elements that 
invaded other areas of mathematics within this same period.  Some of the latter, it 
is important to note, proved ill-conceived in their later consequences and 
eventually required sheepish retraction..  
 What prompted our early nineteenth century heroes to argue in this mystic 
manner?  If we write down, high school algebra style, the sundry equations for 
tangent lines, spheres and projections appearing in the light-bulb-outside-S case 
and solve them as required by inter-substitution, we can work our lengthy way to a 
simple expression for the shadow map in the form Ax.x' + B(x + x’) + C = 0.   
Exactly the same schedule of calculations still go forward in light-bulb-inside-S 
circumstances except that lots of complex numbers will pop up in places where real 
values were obtained before (in particular, our imaginary self-correspondent points 
(a,0) and (b,0) will emerge as the roots of the associated Ax2 + 2Bx + C = 06).   
Fortunately, these complex intermediaries multiply out in the final step when our 
involution mapping formula is extracted.  Clearly something genuine in the world 
of geometry must lie behind our complex-valued algebraic steps, Poncelet and 
Steiner argued, for reasoning cannot stagger its way repeatedly to just conclusions 
unless those steps are tacitly supported by genuine fact all the way along (a 
completely proper appraisal, I believe).  However, claiming that ghost lines and 
points accordingly support our algebraic reasoning scarcely constitutes an adequate 
explanation of our successes and invites mathematical hotheads to populate 
mathematics with ill-conceived supplements willy-nilly .  
 It isn't surprising that a variety of methodological incantations were quickly 
suggested for taming such ghostly antics into unthreatening domesticity.  The most 
popular modern rationalization, dominant since its strong advocacy by David 
Hilbert circa 1900, claims that mathematicians enjoy an intrinsic right to study any 
"freely created structure" they wish as long as its framework can be tightly 
specified via categorical axiomatization.  From this point of view, Steiner merely 
elected to switch his attention from the limited structure of traditional Euclidean 
geometry over to a richer realm he happens to like better (roughly, the idea is: it's 
okay to speak of ghosts as long as they're pretty and adequately axiomatized).  This 
defense through formalism is less adequate than is commonly assumed,7 but we 
needn't bother with those issues here.  But we should observe that, historically, the 
subsequent popularity of Hilbert's recommendations quickly effaced the 
mathematician's memory of the early programs for geometrical rigorization that 
attracted Frege's own attention. 
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 As I noted earlier, I failed to adequately distinguish two approaches to the 
extension elements in my earlier writings on the Grundlagen, although 
disentangling their ingredients helps greatly in appreciating the precise objectives 
that the context principle was designed to serve.  In particular, I mistakenly 
assimilated the efforts of analytic geometers like Otto Stolz and Felix Klein,8 
working in the traditions of the German mathematician Julius Plücker, too hastily 
to the earlier approach of Karl von Staudt.  
 Let us remark, before we consider details of these schemes,  that any attempt 
to rigorize the extension elements must somehow work with the evidential 
considerations to which Poncelet and Steiner hazily appealed.  They had claimed to 
recognize the presence of their ghost points through witnessing their involutionary 
handiwork as it is arrayed along visible lines.  An overlapping involution within a 
projected image is a "sign" that some imaginary point acts secretly behind the 
scenes.  We should therefore expect that such visible mappings will prove central 
within any rigorization program for imaginary points, for they provide the 
recognitional criteria that allowed geometers to first detect the hidden presence of 
the latter. 
 In truth, the claim I have just articulated is too strong, for imaginary points 
display their geometric meddling in a wide variety of ways, just as imps both drag 
chains along staircases and rattle dishes in the pantry.  The would-be rigorist can 
elect any of these symptoms of phantom activity to serve as the entry point for her 
improved treatment of Steiner-flavored geometry; no specific form of poltergeist 
presence enjoys any methodological privilege in this regard.  Nonetheless, 
involutions induced along a line are commonly selected as the critical 
"recognitional criterion" utilized in most programs of rigorization.  
  Von Staudt's own approach is simple in plan, if not execution, although it 
relies upon a very strange ploy.  Consider the abstract objects that naturally 
correspond to the recognitional concepts that allow Poncelet and Steiner to "see" 
their invisible points: if Poncelet espies a parcel of lines falling under the concept  
--is parallel to L, he "sees" a point at infinity; if Steiner witnesses an overlapping 
involution mapping acting on L, he "sees" an imaginary point hovering there.9  
Traditional logic allows that an ample zoo of concept-objects correspond to any 
such evaluative concept, in just the way that the abstract object motherhood 
answers to the evaluative concept being a mother.  Since many of these traditional 
concept-objects arguably suffer fuzzy identity criteria, the least controversial critter 
within the whole menagerie is the trait's  extension, viz., the set {x| x is a mother}.  
Here von Staudt’s basic proposal is: consider the evaluations of setting that inspire 
Steiner and Poncelet to speak of ghost points and construct a salient concept-object 
based upon the traits central to their evaluations.  Thus when Poncelet looks upon 
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the packet of lines parallel to L , he says, “Gee, there must be an infinite point on L 
where all of these other lines will meet it.   Here the salient concept before 
Poncelet’s mind is being parallel to L and the phrase “the direction of L” provides 
an appropriate label for the abstract concept-object that derives from this 
evaluative trait.   Identifying this “concept-object” with its extension equates L’s 
direction with {x| x is a line parallel to L }.  With these abstract objects in hand, 
von Staudt proposes that the direction of L and the involution (in either positive 
or negative senses) along L can now serve as satisfactory surrogates for the 
desired ghost points.   
 I should might remark that, in my limited canvas, advocates of the von 
Staudt program often write rather nebulously with respect to the exact nature of the 
concept-objects to which they appeal.  Thus Theodore Reye, in a very popular 
textbook of the period, glibly writes:  
I would remind you at this point that the statements "parallel lines have the 
same direction" and "parallel lines contain the same infinitely distant point", 
mean exactly the same thing.10 
A more careful writer such as Frege is apt to select the concept's extension as its 
best concept-object surrogate, simply because we know exactly how they should be 
individuated.  Through such a route, we quickly come into close proximity to the 
equivalence class techniques pioneered by Richard Dedekind, although, as I have 
argued elsewhere, the abstractionist philosophical thinking that leads him to this 
destination seems rather different in origin.11 
 As is well known, after §68 of the Grundlagen, Frege embraces the 
equivalence class ploy as his method for introducing numbers, although his 
discussion prior to this point reads entirely as if some more “contextual” form of 
account were being sought.  Indeed, many readers have been startled by the fact 
that, in the course of apparently dispatching the last of several objections to a 
“contextual” treatment,  Frege abruptly announces that the project isn’t viable and 
that we should therefore “try another way”!   It is my surmise that Frege had fully 
intended to introduce his numbers by the methodological route I shall now outline 
(which isn’t exactly one of “contextual definition”) but abandoned the strategy in 
favor of extensions after discovering the glitch recorded in §66.  With respect to 
the context principle itself, it is scarcely evident that considerations of a strongly 
"consider the whole thought first" character play any vital contributing role to the 
unfolding of a von Staudt-like rigorization program, but it will prove central within 
the program I shall now outline.  By reconstructing Frege’s original scheme we can 
appreciate the concrete objectives for which the context principle was formulated.  
As we noted, von Staudt's followers proposed that phrases like "the point at 
infinity on L" can be assigned abstract objects such as sets as their denotations.   
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From this point of view, we should naturally ask, “Which branch of knowledge 
assures us that objects of this ilk exist?” Most nineteenth century primers in logic 
include lengthy discussions of the nature of abstract entities such as motherhood 
and {x| x is a mother} and so it is natural to assume that the “science of logic” 
represents the repository from which a would-be rigorist might draw her “points at 
infinity” surrogates.  This point of view accordingly mandates that "the science of 
logic," if rigorously formulated, must embrace primitive comprehension principles 
of the form 
 For any given concept C, there is a concept-object #C  to which it  
 corresponds. 
And, of course, Frege's later axiom V is exactly of this type, although no mention 
of such principle appears in any of his logical work until after the Grundlagen. 
I will now argue that Frege originally planned to evade employment of such 
a postulate by instead utilizing certain rewriting techniques that were familiar to 
him from his student days at Göttingen.  A reexamination of these older practices 
will render the intended purposes of the context principle considerably more vivid 
than they appear within the unexampled pages of the Grundlagen’s “switching 
strategies in midstream” narrative.  
 The “rewriting” methodology I have in mind was developed by Otto Stolz 
and Felix Klein and self-consciously blends together elements of earlier 
geometrical thinking (such as von Staudt’s) in a very intriguing way.   Let us begin 
with some mundane facts.  If point (a,b) lies on a line L, (a,b) will satisfy an 
equation of the form y = mx + e.  We can abbreviate this incidence claim 
notationally as [m, e]I(a,b), where the concept [m, e]I--  evaluates (a,b) with 
respect to its lying upon (= is incident upon) the line L or not. Here we should 
think initially of "[m, e]I--" as a fused predicative unit.  To take a particular 
example, "[2, -3]I(1, -1)" claims that the point (1, -1) lies on the line y = 2x - 3 (it 
does). 
 In point of fact, geometers such as Julius Plücker (who was Klein's early 
mentor) found it helpful to introduce so-called homogeneous coordinates that 
allow (1, a, b) and all of its multiples (viz. (3, 3a, 3b)) to qualify as equally 
representing the point (a, b) (the idea originally was inspired by considerations of 
centers of gravity).  Employing this trick, our incidence claim looks 
mathematically prettier: viz., [2, -3]I(1, -1) becomes [-3, 2, -1]I(1, 1, -1) where any 
multiple of [-3, 2, -1] also qualifies as a representative of the same line.  In doing 
so, no phrase with a 0 in its first slot of an (a,b,c) triple12 is regarded as 
meaningful—that is, “[-3, 2, -1]I(0, 1, 2)” does not unpack into a sensible 
statement with respect to line/point incidence.  Secretly, however, the plan is 
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eventually to utilize the forbidden “(0, 1, 2)” (and all of its multiples) as a 
coordinate name for the point at infinity lying upon the line y = 2x – 3. 
 If we treat (1, a, b) as variable within our [e, m, -1]I(1, a, b) scheme, we can 
then talk about the range of points carved out along a line, viz. "For every point  
(1, a, b) satisfying [-3, 2, -1]I(1, x, y), there is another point (1, a', b') satisfying [-3, 
2, -1]I(1, x, y) with which it stands in harmonic correlation relative to selected 
fixed points."  When we think of the singular thought [-3, 2, -1]I(1, 1, -1) in this 
way, we conceive the activity of its conceptual evaluation as acting from left to 
right.  Picture this as 
                               ⇒ 
                              [-3, 2, -1]I(1, 1, -1) 
However, Plücker suggested that this same thought can be analyzed with an 
opposite action, even if we don't naturally regard it in this way.  That is, we picture 
its functional activity as  
                                 ⇐   
                                 [-3, 2, -1]I(1, 1, -1)   
Parsed this way, the evaluative unit --I(1, 1, -1)  carves out a packet of lines as its 
left-hand value range.  Indeed, this totality of lines will comprise the pencil of 
lines that run through the Cartesian point (1, -1).  Applying a quantifier to this 
newly emancipated slot, we can now express "dualized" general thoughts such as 
"For every line (e, m, -1) satisfying [x, y, -1]I(1, 1, -1), there is another line (e', m', 
-1) also satisfying [x, y, -1]I(1, 1, -1) in which it stands in 
harmonic correlation relative to selected fixed lines."  In 
other words, the previously fused predicative subunit "[e, 
m, -1]" is now treated as a species of name, providing a 
line coordinate for the line L comparable to the 
homogeneous point coordinates (1, 1, -1) we have been 
employing to locate points on the plane.13  By supplying 
appropriate geometrical meaning to the usual operations of 
addition and multiplication with respect to these new coordinates, equations can be 
readily articulated in line coordinate terms as well, supplying a line equation for a 
curve fully comparable to, although usually different in form, from its conventional 
expression as an equation with respect to points (such line equations carve out 
curves as the envelopes of their tangent lines rather than as loci of points).    
 Of course, lines are also geometrical objects already familiar to us, but with 
fairly minimal requirements on good behavior, we can harness the coefficients that 
appear in virtually any kind of evaluative equation as new "coordinate names" to 
designate "geometrical objects" that seem novel or even strange in their underlying 
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conception.  For example, in his "Lecture on the Geometry of Pairs of Points in the 
Plane,"14  Frege employs our trick of reversing the direction of functional activity 
in a formula (he utilizes the line equation for a degenerate conic) in order to 
produce suitable coordinate names for pairs of points regarded as comprising 
single, fused entities.  That is, Frege invites us to look upon a regular Euclidean 
plane and "see" it, not as decomposing into solitary points, but as instead 
fragmenting into a gaggle of point-partnerships bound irrevocably together over 
long distances (this remotely paired structuring is hard to visualize as it constitutes 
a four dimensional, non-Euclidean geometry).  In other words, Frege claims that 
the usual collection {(9, -3), (-6, 7)} can be alternatively approached as a basic 
geometrical entity answering to five term homogeneous coordinates like <1, -2, -
3.7, -9, 0>, in terms of which regular points like (9,-3) can be derivatively defined 
as a "locus of point pairs."  Plainly, Frege embraces the astonishing contention of 
the Plücker school that such a methodology provides an acceptable scheme for 
sculpting a plane or space into base primitive elements other than regular points.  
Indeed, I believe that the context principle is intended to serve as a philosophical 
rationale to convince us that such direction-reversing recarvings of thoughts place 
genuine "objects" before our attention: point pairs as "just as good" qua "objects" 
as regular points, although they initially prove harder to "see."    
Today, courtesy of the fashion in which Richard Dedekind and his school 
reshaped “algebra” in the late nineteenth century, we have become accustomed to 
constructing new forms of mathematical objects as equivalence classes of already 
accepted objects15 and have probably lost sight of how novel—and even bizarre—
the technique would have appeared when first introduced.  Urging instead that a 
range of novel “objects” can be accepted as mathematically well defined once all 
of their sentential occurrences have been provided with crisp truth-values can 
easily appear, in the context of Frege’s time, like a less radical technique answering 
to the same necessities for enlarging mathematics’ dominions rigorously.   From 
this point of view, it is imperative that we look upon Frege's peculiar “point pairs,” 
not in a modern manner as algebraically ordered pairs, but as primitive objects 
extracted from the geometrical woodwork by Plückerish techniques  
  From an epistemological point of view, Frege cheerfully concedes that our 
knowledge of the facts of geometry first comes to us in an intellectual presentation 
prejudiced in favor of points.  But this genetic origin provides no reason, he thinks, 
why geometry, considered as an tidily organized science, might not find that 
alternative base elements work more effectively as a choice of primitive basis.  As 
he observes in his review of Lange's book on The Law of Inertia:  
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I should like to subscribe to his statement "that elementary concepts are not 
the original data of a science," or as I would like to express it, that they must 
first be discovered by logical analysis.16  
Although Frege, in his geometrical endeavors, allows the pursuit of scientific 
organization to ignore, quite blatantly and radically, any decompositional 
responsibility to intuitive expectation,  this crucial fact seems lost on the many 
commentators who assume contrariwise that Frege seeks a "conceptual analysis" of 
"number" that reports, in the mode of Anglo-American analytic philosophy, upon 
"the knowledge we must possess to prove competent in the use of 'number.'"  But 
never was a thought further from his mind; Frege’s loyalty to our “kindergarten” 
understandings reaches no farther than the weak fealty that geometrical rigorists 
owe to Poncelet and Steiner’s original apologetics on behalf of their novel varieties 
of “point.” 
In sum, it is clearly Frege’s belief that, although a “point pair” is not an 
object that we learn about from direct geometrical intuition, this newly extracted 
gizmo should be regarded as “every bit as real,” on an ontological appraisal, as a 
regular geometrical point.  The basic intent of the context principle was to argue 
for this rather startling form of ontological tolerance, as we shall soon see.  
 To appreciate that Frege’s thinking is not idiosyncratic within his period, let 
us examine how Stolz and Klein propose to wed this vein of Plückerish 
decomposition to von Staudt's prior endeavors and thereby generate a novel 
rationale for the imaginary points and lines and their comrades at infinity.  Let me 
first articulate the basic strategy in rough terms and then introduce a critical 
refinement.  Expressed in homogenous terms, recall that as yet we have supplied 
no meaning to equations of the form "[m, n, r]I(0, b, c)."  However, when we study 
the action of  --I(1, 2, 1) in a thought like “[1,1,2]I(1, 2, 1),” we observe that a 
pencil of intersecting lines is carved out as its value range.  The coordinates of each 
of these lines will be related to one another by linear transformations.  It will then 
occur to us that we are missing certain packets of the same type, i.e., the arrays of 
lines that run parallel to one another, despite their similar formal relationships to 
one another.  This observation suggests that we should try to enlarge (= redefine) 
our --I(a, b, c) family of evaluative concepts to some wider I* able to grade the 
missing bundles of parallels in the desired way.  And lo and behold!, it happens 
that our previously meaningless syntactic combinations "--I(0, b, c)" can capture 
exactly the range of extended discriminations we want if we simply multiply left 
and right sides together in the same way as we would for “--I(1, 1, 2)”-like 
combinations.  That is, the free variable formula [1, X, -Y]I*(0, 1, 2) supplies us, 
after multiplication, with the line equation Y = 2X which is satisfied by all lines 
that satisfy equations of the form y = 2x + b (where the y-intercept b can assume 
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any real value).  Clearly every packet of parallels can be captured in these terms.  
Accordingly, it is easy to definitionally extend our old talk of "I" to a new "I*" that 
also tolerates right-hand syntax of a "I*(0, 1, 2)" mien.  Of course, the fact that this 
works isn’t a miracle; homogeneous coordinates were designed precisely to play 
this role.  
 At this point, "--I*(0, 1, 2)" still constitutes a holistically fused unit.  But, 
following our "context principle" liberality, we can reverse the functional activity 
of a singular thought such as [1, 2, -3]I*(0, 1, 2) to a forward direction, as long as 
its new right hand range proves adequately well behaved (of which more in a 
moment).   If so, our newly liberated "(0, 1, 2)" now qualifies as the "coordinate 
name" of some previously undisclosed geometrical object supplementary to our 
old-fashioned Euclidean points (let us dub this naturally extended value range 
POINTS ). Voila! a suitable "point at infinity," prized from the woodwork of bland 
geometrical fact through no other means beyond the twin processes of explicitly 
defined conceptual enlargement and a Plückerish reorientation of functional 
activity.  Thus we appear to have successfully crossed the bar that separates our 
original range of Euclidean points from the POINTS at infinity without evoking 
any brute existence postulate of an axiom V type along the way.  By the same trick, 
we can install a “LINE at infinity” by assigning evaluative meaning to the 
previously meaningless  
“[1, 0, 0]I*--” evaluator.   Stolz and Klein also showed that von Staudt's program 
for introducing the imaginary POINTS via involution-"objects" can be mimicked 
through a rewriting technique of roughly this ilk.   That is, they will parse any 
claim of incidence with an imaginary POINT (“--I*(-4, -2 √-1, 6)”) in terms of a 
relationship to an overlapping involution installed along some affiliated real line.17  
 Once we have begun in this way, we must take great care in insuring, 
through a schedule of explicit definitions, that other old geometrical notions (such 
as "—intersects ...") rigorously extend to liberalized replacements ("-- 
INTERSECTS...")  able to ratify the geometrical behaviors we expect to witness 
within our expanded dominions.  Each of these definitional rewritings must be 
precisely specified and we must never assume, in Poncelet or Steiner's offhanded 
manner, that such extended relationships continue to hold within our POINT/LINE 
domain without proof.  In this regard, Stolz and Klein successfully imitate the 
methodological rigor that von Staudt brought to his own work, without needing to 
rely upon abstract intermediaries such as sets as artificial surrogates for the 
additional POINTS et al.   True: both forms of treatments (von Staudt’s and 
Stolz/Klein’s) are founded in the same recognitional criteria (parallels and 
involutions) that inspired Steiner and Poncelet to make their original leaps of 
geometrical faith, but, in adhering to strict standards of definitional introduction 
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throughout, both forms of rigorist program manage to convert loose inspiration 
into sober scientific construction.  We are thus assured that the extension elements 
of nineteenth century geometry will never engender the inconsistencies that often 
bedeviled other forms of mathematical enlargements that had been explicated only 
by loose hand waving of the sort supplied by Poncelet and Steiner (some of 
Riemann’s great work became subject to these humilations, for example). 
 Here, then, is the original purpose of the context principle as I reconstruct it.  
Introduce by definitional extension a brace of new names and predicative 
expressions, in a manner such that a well behaved range of syntactic surrogates for 
the desired imaginary and infinitely distant points appear.  Then argue 
philosophically that, since the newly introduced names behave exactly like those 
for accepted forms of object, these new specimens should qualify, in the same 
fashion as Frege’s point-pairs, as “just as good,” ontologically, as regular points.  
Here our Plückerish capacity to reverse the predicative activity within a complete 
thought is integral to this contention.  But if such tenets are accepted, we require no 
axiom V to install our new points—or natural numbers,--upon the mathematical 
stage. 
However, to carry this philosophical program through, we must ensure that 
our techniques genuinely assign a truth-value to every grammatically accepted 
claim and that our newly introduced name-like syntax will behave, from a logical 
point of view, completely like a range of true names.  But this success can be 
guaranteed, Frege thinks, if we approach our rewriting task in a proscribed order 
(in these methodological demands Frege goes beyond anything I find in Klein—a 
point to which I’ll revert in a moment).  In particular, our program should always 
commence by articulating the standards we will follow in deciding, given some 
circumstance involving several imaginary POINTS, how many of them are actually 
at issue (being able to count the number of POINTS of intersection of two curves is 
critical to the success of our extended geometry).  In this instance, the concern 
proves rather tricky because quite dissimilar names “(-4, -2 √-1, 6)” and “(-2√ -1, 1 
, 3√ -1)” need to designate the same point (they differ merely by a complex 
multiple).  Since Stolz and Klein tie these names to the evaluation of involution 
maps upon nearby lines, it is necessary to check that our "common multiple" 
requirement reflects answers to a well-defined equivalence relation amongst these 
maps, as Stolz and Klein verify.  Following Frege, we can set this demand for 
coherence in the following format.18  For ordinary points, we already know that  
 (a, b, c) = (a', b', c') if and only if there is a λ such that a = λ a', b = λ b', etc. 
This “common multiple” behavior, it turns out, naturally corresponds to the way 
that a certain λ -1/ λ pairing lays itself out as a nested involution along the line 
leading from the origin through (a, b, c), with the latter serving as one of the 
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involution's self-correspondent points.  In other words, for ordinary points a 
geometrical criterion of the following type holds: 
(*) (a, b, c) = (a', b', c') if and only if both represent the same sense of a 
coincident involution along exactly the same induced line. 
Stolz and Klein establish the existence of an extended equivalence relation E with 
respect to their imaginary POINT names: 
(**)     (a, b, c) E (a', b', c') if and only if both represent the same sense of an 
coincident involution along exactly the same induced line. 
(although the recipe for finding the induced line in question is more elaborate and 
the involution will now prove overlapping).  Once again, the “common multiple” 
identification of our  imaginary POINT names rests upon a natural λ -1/ λ behavior 
along their associated real line.  This affinity shows that the relation E behaves as a 
natural analog to old “=” with respect to our new dominion of POINTS.  Finding 
the proper E to extend “=” looks as if it provides a precise key for rigorizing 
Steiner’s old forms of fuzzy pleading on behalf of his "ghosts."   
 As I understand his terminology, Frege considers (**) to represent the basic 
recognition judgment that, through conceptually extending the old identity 
criterion (*) in a natural manner, supplies a suitable bridge to an extended 
relationship (call it =*) that can serve as a suitably behaved identity surrogate over 
our expanded POINT dominion.  In other words, the contents of (*) and (**) 
supply the ingredients of a definition by cases for the new identity notion "=*" 
required within our expanded language.  Once this surrogate has been installed 
upon a suitable footing, Frege asks that the other new predicates we shall need 
(e.g.,  “--- INTERSECTS __“) should be systematically introduced by explicit 
definition, verifying as we proceed that Leibniz’ law with respect to our basal “=*” 
remains obeyed.  As Frege articulates this plan with respect to the points at 
infinity: 
The meaning of any other type of assertion about [points at infinity] would 
have first of all to be defined and in defining it we can make it a rule always 
to see that it must remain possible to substitute for the [infinite point on any 
line] the [infinite point on] any line parallel to it.19  
Here I have substituted “point at infinity” for Frege’s pallid “direction” to render 
its methodological substance more vivid. 
It is easy to see how the introduction of the various species of number can be 
accommodated to the same scheme: we let “#C” be the name we carve out when 
we Plückerize the thought that “the objects bearing concept C can be mapped 1-to-
1 to the objects bearing concept D.”  The celebrated “Hume’s principle” (“#C = #D 
if and only if C maps 1-to-1 to D”) then can serve as the natural “recognition 
judgment” we should employ to extend old “=” into the enlarged dominion of 
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natural number.  And it is plain that he plans to approach the real and complex 
numbers in this same vein as well, for he writes in this regard:  
 Everything will in the end come down to the search for a judgment-content 
 which can be transformed into an identity whose sides precisely are the new 
 numbers.20  
As I understand his intent, he conceives the judgment on the right side of (**) as a 
kind of box, such that if we rattle its contents properly (= associate its "(a, b, c)" 
and "(a', b', c')" pieces to suitable ranges of variation), we can be left with a 
relational "__E..."  in its middle so relieved of specific content (the bulk having 
shifted into the (a, b, c) and (a', b', c') ends of our carton) that this unloaded E can 
adequately play =*'s role with respect to our new objects. 
 However, let us now examine the subtle glitch that derails all of these pretty 
plans.  Let us attempt to assemble our old “=” and “E” pieces into a formal 
definition by cases for "=*".  We obtain:  
 (a, b, c) =* (a', b', c') if and only if   
  (i) (a, b, c) and (a', b', c') are old objects and (a, b, c) =  (a', b', c') or 
 (ii) (a, b, c) and (a', b', c') are new points and both represent the same 
sense of a coincident involution along exactly the same induced line. 
Note that no clause is required to monitor mixtures of new and old objects because 
our identity claim will always prove false in such circumstances.  Unfortunately, 
our proposal plainly does not satisfy the strict demands upon definitional practice 
we have set ourselves, for our defiens utilizes vocabulary that does not appear in 
the old language of unvarnished Euclidean geometry.  In fact, neither of the 
classifiers “old object” or “new point” belong to that vocabulary.  Nor, for the 
same reason, can we permissibly employ terms like “(0,1,2)” as meaningful, for the 
whole purpose of our definitional endeavors is to settle a meaning upon such 
phrases; we cannot presume that such meanings already lie in place.  But without 
the forbidden vocabulary, we lack a meaningful pivot around which the two parts 
of our definition by cases can turn, for we need a criterion to decide to whether 
“=*” is to be applied in manner (i) or in manner (ii).  But the natural concepts we 
would like to appoint to this role are “is a new point” and “is a point at infinity” 
but proper restrictions upon definitional practice forbid both of them to us at this 
stage.   
This, essentially, is the objection that Frege poses for himself in §§66 and 
67.  There are many passages in the later parts of the Grundlagen that suggest that 
he harbored a persistent hope that this obstacle might be eventually evaded and that 
numbers might be successfully introduced without recourse to sets.  However, 
Frege plainly never found a way to do this and he was forced to rely upon the 
crutch of extensions to complete the Grundlagen. 
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 What has gone wrong?  The nub of the problem apparently lies in the fact 
that, in concentrating initially upon simple identity judgments, we lose our hold 
over the fuller geometrical contexts that motivated the postulation of extension 
elements in the first place.  Recall how Steiner-type thinking conjured up several 
imaginary points in our discussion of the cat map: we appealed to the qualities of 
visible involutions allegedly controlled by their unseen influence.   As long as we 
can appeal to the visible clutter that surrounds our ghost points, we will be able to 
separate the two pivotal clauses in our “definition by cases” by reference to the 
behaviors of old-fashioned Euclidean objects.  For example, consider the claim 
“Every line and every circle always intersect in four points” (importantly true in 
our extended framework although plainly false in a strict Euclidean format).  Given 
a specific choice of line L and circle C, then our expanded treatment of 
“INTERSECTION POINT” can be divided into the correct subcases by appeal to 
the Euclidean characteristics of L and C: if they intersect in a Euclidian sense, then 
“POINT common to L and C” is to interpreted as old-fashioned “point” but if L 
and C fail to intersect in a conventional sense, “POINT common to L and C” is to 
be parsed, in Stolz/Klein fashion, as “L and C induce the same overlapping 
involutions along the coordinate axes.”  In short, once a larger swatch of context is 
made available to us than is provided with respect to Frege’s narrow and out of 
context identity claims, the critical claims of our new geometry can be easily 
rewritten in Euclidean terms without circularity.  Wider context allows us to 
eschew forbidden vocabulary such as “is a new point” in favor of entirely kosher 
Euclidean notions.  
 However, if we follow this liberalized policy in justifying the key assertions 
of extended geometry, we will be approaching our task contextually in Bertrand 
Russell's manner: pertinent discourse with respect to “imaginary points” et al. gets 
rewritten in terms of wider scope articulations that speak only of regular points, 
parallels and involutionary relationships.  If this ploy is adopted, our new surrogate 
for extended identity "=*" will almost surely fail to obey the regular laws of 
identity (e.g., "the present king of France = the present king of France" comes out 
false).  But then our "context principle" rationale for claiming that our newly hewn 
POINTS qualify as "just as good ontologically" as regular points utterly collapses, 
for our “POINTS” manifest various forms of oddball logical behavior never 
witnessed in real "objects" (which is one reason why Russell regarded his own 
contextually introduced “descriptions” as designating logical fictions).  Such 
ontological foibles needn’t prove an embarrassment insofar as Stolz and Klein are 
concerned, for they are not motivated by any philosophical concern to establish the 
imaginary points as "self-subsisting objects."  For their purposes, it is enough to 
settle all discourse of POINTS upon firm truth-values.  However, for Frege’s more 
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philosophical enterprises,  to admit POINTS or numbers merely as “logical 
fictions” is tantamount to utter defeat.  Such are the reasons why I earlier declared 
that the context principle was never intended as apologetics for “contextual 
definition” in the Russellian sense illustrated here, but only for a more narrowly 
proscribed—and, most likely, unworkable—scheme of definitional rewriting.  
The alternative von Staudt plan for introducing the extension points via 
identification with sets (or some other variety of “concept-object”) suffers no 
comparable lapse because its point surrogates are certified to exist by primitive 
logical principle.  Confronted with his §66 glitch, Frege apparently elected to 
revert to this older definitional tactic in order to finish the Grundlagen with a 
properly framed account of number as "self-subsisting."  In so doing, he was 
forced to abandon his plans for reaching that objective without brute appeal to a 
comprehension principle of axiom V type.  Since the Stolz/Klein approach comes 
tantalizingly close to satisfying his original intentions, we can sympathize with his 
apparent hope that he will someday discover the clever trick that can patch over the 
§66 obstacle and supply an introduction of number closer to his original context 
principle expectations, despite the fact that, at present, he must utilize the 
expedient of extensions in order to finish his book.  And this story, I submit, 
provides the critical background that explains why the discussion throughout the 
Grundlagen proves so persistently mystifying: why it is that Frege continually hints 
at some radical approach to ontological issues that never seems exemplified within 
his own proposals.  
 In our own time, a number of authors such as Crispin Wright and Bob Hale 
have suggested that “recognition judgments” like Hume’s Principle should be 
accepted as a wholly adequate foundation upon which the introduction of abstract 
objects can be founded.  The most striking aspect of these proposals is that they 
seem insufficiently concerned, in my limited canvas, with the methodological 
dangers to which incomplete hand waving specifications of a Poncelet/Steiner ilk 
are prone.  Frege’s own labors, in contrast (as well as those of von Staudt, Stolz 
and Klein), were motivated by an ambition to ward off such disasters through strict 
methodological procedures.  To our nineteenth century investigators, partial 
specifications like an unsupplemented Hume’s principle seemed apt to open a 
Pandora’s box of problems later on.  Indeed, I believe that if we must tolerate the 
pathways of the ill-defined in mathematics, it would be wiser to embrace the darker 
vision of “conceptual growth” sketched by Ernst Cassirer, for he recognized better 
the potential disorder that may lie ahead than do the Pollyannas of modern neo-
logicism.21  
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